1 April, Wednesday. - 9.30 h. Opening session. - 10.00 h. Francois Maniquet (Universitè Catholique
de Louvain. Belgique). Compensate team members under multiple tasks. - 11.30 h. Bernhard von Stengel
(London School of Economics. UK). Strategic characterization of the index of an equilibrium. - 12.15
h. Isaac Meilijson (School of Mathematical Sciences. Tel Aviv University. Israel). Risk and
Uncertainty Aversion in the Rank-dependent Utility. - 14.30 h. Stef Tijs (CentER and Department of
Operation Research. Tilburg University. The Netherlands). Lexicographic optimization in cooperative
game theory. - 15.15 h. Carles Rafels (Universidad de Barcelona. España). The aggregate-monotonic
core & Monotonicity and core selections in cooperative games with transferable utility. - 16.30 h.
Poster session. 2 April, Thursday. - 10.00 h. William Thomson (University of Rochester. New York,
USA). - 11.30 h. Carmen Herrero (Universidad de Alicante. España). The rights egalitarian solution
for NTU sharing problems. - 12.15 h. Gustavo Bergantiños (Universidad de Vigo. España). The division
problem with voluntary participation. - 14.30 h. Jean-Jacques Herings (University of Maastricht. The
Netherlands). Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. - 15.15 h. José
Manuel Zarzuelo (Universidad del País Vasco. Bilbao, España). The bilateral consistent prekernel and
the core on NTU games and exchange economies. - 16.00 h. Poster session.